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The Hampel Committee
Report: a transatlantic critique
To an American observer, the activities of the Cadbury, Greenbwy
and Hampel Committees are impressive, if only because so few
lawyers seem to be involved. Unlike the US, where improvements in corporate governance can usually be traced to legislation or litigation, British efforts at self-governance offer an
attractive, alternative model. The Hampel Report is disappointing, however, in three respects: the report lacks concrete models; its reliance on the AGM as a mechanism of reform is

misplaced; and its failure to recognise internal monitoring
programmes as an essential element of good corporate governance is shortsighted.
Introduction
As an American, I have observed with considerable awe and
respect the resources that have been devoted to improving
corporate governance In Britain. Since the creation of PRO-

NED in the 1980s, some of the most interesting innovations in
this area seem to have come from Britain. In addition, the
process by which British businesses have addressed the
problems of governance have a singularly appealing character.
Let me be more specific. While in the United States most
improvements in corporate governance have arisen in response to the actions of lawyers, in Britain, it seems, improvements in corporate governance have arisen largely
because business leaders have tried to address business
problems by employing a businesslike approach: (1) identify
the problem; (2) gather information from all available sources;
(3) consider possible solutions; (4) set a course of action; and
(5) implement the programme. The motivation behind these
actions may well have been to avoid more regulation by the
state. But the process of corporate-governance reform in
Britain seems very different from, and more sensible than,
the lawyer-driven approach to corporate governance we
have become accustomed to in the US.
The composition of the Cadbury Committee, for example,
was remarkable to me in its variety and the degree of power
it represented. The same applies to the Greenbury and
Hampel Committees.1 The sponsorship of these committees
was itself a revelation. To bring together the resources of the
Stock Exchange, the CBI, the Institute of Directors, leading
institutional investors and accountants—all for the purpose
of trying to improve the quality of corporate governance and
accountability—makes a statement of shared commitment
that would be unimaginable—though probably quite desirable—in the United States? We seem instead to have entrusted most of our corporate-governance discussions to the
membership of the American Law Institute.'
Though I am a member of the ALI, I don't believe that
lawyers (or judges or even legal scholars) are necessarily the
greatest source of wisdom into how to make complex enterprises work well, prosper and grow, and generate wealth for
all concerned. Certainly, devising corporate-governance rules
as a product of contentious, high-stakes litigation, as has
occurred repeatedly in the US,' is not the ideal scenario for
nuanced, careful thinking on the issue. Thus, the inclusive,
proactive approach that I have observed in Britain seems to

me far preferable to the American model.
A related phenomenon is the apparent belief among UK
business leaders that self-regulation--frequently the resort
of those about to be regulated—may actually work. This
belief may, of course, be a function of the power of the parties
who have leant their support to, and the broad consultative
process that goes into, the creation of a self-governance
programme. But my experience in America is that blueribbon panels—however distinguished—and codes of best
practices—however carefully designed—seldom generate
behavioural change in a consistent, dependable way. Rather,
whatever true reform in American corporate-governance
practices has come about in the last 20 years has occurred
because: (1) the Securities and Exchange Commission has
required that the change occur;' (2) the Delaware Supreme
Court has ruled that failure to make such a change may
expose directors to personal liability; 6(3)aUnitedSs
federal district court has either required or prohibited specific governance behaviour (typically related to disclosure); 7
(4)thecompanyiqus becatgdyhvr
aggressive American business press for failing to make the
change;8 or (5) a core group of independent directors has
forced the change over the objection of company managers. 9
Themotivanfrcghsypialbenfrohm.
Aspirational notions of simply trying to do things better
seldom are part of the mix.
Stated another way, the processes by which American
public companies (slowly) came to have a majority of outside
directors on their boards; by which the nominating process
for new directors (slowly) migrated from exclusive CEO
control to shared control with outside directors; by which
serious intervention into the management of poorly performing companies—including removal of the CEO and other top
executives—(slowly) became a real option for thoughtful,
proactive boards of directors; or by which the value of
designating a lead director (if not in fact dividing the roles of
chairman and chief executive) (slowly) is becoming recognised by American public companies—all can be traced
either to a fear of litigation or fear of an exposé in the Wall
Street Journal, not to any organised effort at self-regulation.' 10
5 See, eg, SEC Exchange Act Release 34-31327 (Executive Compensation

1

One thing that did strike me, of course, was the fact that ali three of these
committees were comprised exclusively of men. It surprised me that no
one could identify even a single woman of sufficient professional credentials—either in the business or academic worlds—to merit an appointment to any of these committees.

2 The closest we have come in the US to this kind of shared commitment to
improved corporate governance is the project undertaken by the Working
Group on Corporate Governance, comprised of three corporate execu-

Disclosure) (1992) (describing in detail how executive compensation
decisions are to he communicated to shareholders).
6 See, eg, Smith a van Gorkom 488 A 2d 858 (Del 1985) (holding that directors
may be held personally liable if they fail to devote adequate time to
determining the fair price for a sale of the company); Re Caremark
International Inc Derivative Litigation 698 A 2d 959 (Del Ch 1996) (holding
that directors may he held personally liable for failure to ensure that an

tives (all lawyers), two prominent attorneys in private practice and three

appropriate information and reporting system is in place within the
company).

representatives of institutional investors. See 'A New Compact for Owners
and Directors' (1991) 141 Harvard Business Review, July/August.

7 See, eg, Irving Bank Corp a Bank of New York Lb Inc 692 F Supp 163 (SDNY
1988) (tender offeror prohibited from going forward, unless substantial

3 The ALI is comprised of 3,000 or so lawyers, judges and law professors and

additional disclosure is provided by means of a supplemental prospectus); American Comers Inc a Baytree Investors Inc 685 F Supp 800 (D Kan

was the sponsor of the Principles of Corporate Governance project,
completed in 1992.
4 See, eg, Unocal Corp a Mesa Petroleum Co 493 A 2d 946 (Del 1985) (holding
that a board may invoke defence mechanisms In the face of a hostile
takeover bid, but only so long as the defence is proportionate to the threat
posed); Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc 506 A 2d 173 (Del
1986) (holding that, at some point, a board must terminate its efforts to
avoid a takeover and put the company up for auction); Paramount
Communications Inc a Time Inc 571 A 2d 1140 (Del 1989) (holding that a company

1988) (same); and Kaufman a Cooper Companies Inc 719 F Supp 174 (SDNY
1989) (annual meeting is enjoined and ali proxies voided, so that both
parties to a proxy contest may provide accurate disclosure to shareholders).
8 See, eg, John A Byrne, The Best and Worst Boards' {1997) 90 Business
Week, 8 December (identifying and discussing companies with the worst
corporate-governance scores—this is an annual exercise).

point to a long-term business plan that they believe presents a better

9 See, eg, Robert AG Monks and Neli Minow, Corporate Governance (1995),
360-8 (describing the 'palace coup' by non-executive directors at General
Motors Corp in 1992).

opportunity for the company); Paramount Communications Inc v PVC

10 Even with all this progress, 'it is safe to say that American boards to day are

Network Inc 637 A 2d 34 (Del 1994) (holding that when a company

still only marginally more effective than they were ten years ago. On a scale
of 1 to 10, they may collectively have moved from, say 2 or 3 to maybe 4 or

confronted with a cash takeover hid may resist that bid, if directors can

undertakes a transaction leading to a change In corporate control, the
directors' obligation is to obtain the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders).

5. So there is plenty of scope for significant further improvement.' Robert
AG Monks and Nell Minow, Watching the Watchers' Corporate Governance

Similarly, the improvements that have occurred in the
setting of executive compensation in the United States have
been energised, in turn, by (1) intense press scrutiny of
overpaid executives;" (2) a directive by the SEC requiring
detailed annual disclosure of the compensation paid to directors and the five most highly paid executives of each public
company; 12 and (3) legislation by the US Congress, withholding the corporate tax deduction for any compensation paid in
excess of $1m, unless that compensation is 'performance
based.13 American financial disclosure requirements are imposed by legislation and monitored carefully by the SEC.
By contrast, substantial progress has been achieved in
Britain in several areas of corporate-governance practice just
since the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992, without
the intervention of the government and (apparently) without
the threat of litigation. The Report on Compliance with the
[Cadbury Committee's] Code of Best Practice details
14
measurable improvements by listed companies in the nominating
process, the determination of executive compensation and
the identification of lead directors. According to the Financial
Times, there have been other 'clear changes for the better in
UK corporate-governance practices' since Cadbury. 15 I take
these changes to include better financial controls, better
communications with shareholders and a more thoughtful
approach to corporate-governance issues generally.
This is a remarkable record of progress in a very short
period of time and is all the more remarkable in light of the
fact that British investors lack two of the 'big sticks' which are
available in the United States to reinforce shareholder demands: the shareholder class action lawsuit; and auditor
liability to third parties. Without those tools (both of which
have been criticised and both of which recently have been
curtailed in the United States), 16 many of the corporategovernance reforms Americans now look to as models, simply would not have come about. Without the further 'big stick'
of the SEC (and judges who enforce its rules), the current high
quality of disclosure in the United States—financial disclosure generally and disclosure of executive compensation
specifically—would never have been achieved.
Thus, to see British business leaders pursuing these objectives voluntarily—or at least to be moving in the right direction—is impressive and seems almost Victorian in its
uprightness. Though some may doubt the sincerity of these
efforts,17 few can doubt that the Cadbury Report was bold,
clear-headed and shrewd in its approach to shaping corporate behaviour; that the Greenbury Report tackled an issue
that many would have preferred to leave unexamined and
issued a code of best practices that was both sensible and
exacting; and that the Hampel Committee Report, though less
innovative than the other two, has moved the discussion
for the 21st Century (1996), 295.
11 See, eg, John A Byrne, That Eye-Popping Executive Pay: Is Anybody Worth
This Much?' (1994) Business Week, 25 April at 52; James W Michaels,
'Should Anyone Earn $25,000 a Day?' (1992) Forbes, 25 May; Shawn Tully,
'What CEOs Really Make' (1992)Fortune, 15 June; Dana Wechsler, 'Would
Adam Smith Pay Them So Much?' (1990) Forbes, 28 May.
12 See note 5 above.
13 Internal Revenue Code, s 162(m).
14 24 May 1995.
15 Editorial, 'Governance' Financial Times, 29 January 1998.
16 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 significantly raised the
requirements for shareholders wishing to sue companies for disclosure
violations in federal courts. A decision by the United States Supreme Court
In 1994 held that shareholders cannot employ an aiding-and-abetting
theory to sue companies' auditors in federal courts.
17 See Robert Bruce, 'Hampel Offers Up a Big Serving of Fudge' The Times, 5
February 1998.

forward and promises to consolidate in one place the current
understanding of achievable corporate-governance practices.
A third impressive feature of the UK's recent corporategovernance activities, from my perspective, has been the
refusal of all three committees to be lured too deeply into the
'other constituencies' debate. This debate, of course, has
been going on for decades. 18 It surfaces periodically, especially when a constituency wants to advance its position.
Sometimes the agitator is a consumer group;" sometimes it
is an employee group; 20 sometimes, as in the case of environmental grievances, it is a more broadly based group. These
groups almost always have a valid claim against a particular
company or industry. None has ever yet, however, presented
a claim sufficient to persuade policy-makers either in Britain
or the United States that the profit-maximising norms of
classic corporate law should be amended in Its favour!'
Therefore, it would not have been a productive use of these
committees' resources to trudge down the 'other constituencies' road again. 22
In a nutshell, then, the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel
Committees all appear to have done an impressive job of
keeping focused on the most important issues surrounding
corporate-governance concerns: (1) identifying those practices that help boards of directors function and lead most
effectively; (2) encouraging useful communications with investors and the public; and (3) empowering (and admonishing) all of the company's constituents to play the role they are
best suited to play in the complex task of stimulating corporate growth and performance. They have done so with alacrity," and produced three high-quality work products. I
question some of the results, however, and it is to these areas
that I now turn.
Focusing on the Hampel Committee Report, three specific
items captured my attention: (1) the Committee's failure to
provide models for the behaviour they prescribe; (2) the
Committee's professed belief that any significant change can
be accomplished in the context of the AGM; and (3) the
Committee's failure of nerve in recognising that in-house
compliance programmes can provide important support for
the board's monitoring role, but declining to recommend that
every public company adopt such a programme, specifically
tailored to its needs.
18 See, eg, AA Berle, Jr, 'Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust' (1931) 44
Harvard Law Review 1049; E Merrick Dodd, Jr, For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?' (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1145; AA Berle, Jr, 'For
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees' (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review
1365; and E Merrick Dodd, Jr, 'Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary
Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?' (1935) 2 University of Chicago
Law Review 194.
19 See, eg, Ralph Nader, Taming the Giant Corporation (1976); and Ralph
Nader, The Consumer and Corporate Accountability (1973).
20 See, eg, Your Stake at Work: TUC Proposals for a Stakeholder Economy
(1996), 23-4 (proposing that company law be amended to Include required
compliance with both the Cadbury and Greenbury Codes and also proposing that directors' duties should include specific obligations to stakeholders
other than shareholders).
21 The 'other constituency' statutes that have been passed In the United
States do not alter the primary objective of profit-maximisation. They
simply give express permission for (and in the state of Connecticut
require) boards to consider the interests of other stakeholders when
considering strategic options. Section 309 of the Companies Act, dealing
with employees, similarly does not alter a company's primary duty to its
shareholders.
22 I understand the Labour government has been giving serious thought as
to how an other-constituencies perspective might be implemented. See
'Beckett Urges Modernisation of Company Law Financial Times, 5 March
1998. One should feel greatly comforted that the government is approaching this question with caution.
23 By contrast, the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance project took 14

Modelling good behaviour
When it comes to disclosure, American companies have little
doubt about what information they are obliged to deliver, and
how they are supposed to deliver it. The SEC has set out in
meticulous detail both the content and format for disclosures
relating to directors' past history and current activities,
conflicts of interest, legal and financial entanglements, attendance at meetings, committee assignments, etc." It also
prescribes very specifically the way in which executive compensation is to be disclosed," the way in which a company's
short-term and long-term financial performance in relation to
its competitors is to be disclosed , 28 the items to be addressed
in the management's discussion and analysis of the past
year's performance and future prospects," and a number of
other items that are identified as important in the Hampel
Committee Report. There Is nothing magical about the SECimposed model, and I am not suggesting that Hampel failed by
not embracing that particular model or any other. But giving
company executives a clearer idea of what good behaviour
and good disclosure look like in detail—where possible by
using excerpts from recent company reports but where no
'real' models yet exist, by creating simulated examples in
several alternative formats—would have made the Hampel
Committee report more immediately useable by those at
whom it was aimed. 28

Reliance on the AGM as a mechanism of true
accountability
In most American companies—and most British ones, too, I
suspect—the annual shareholders' meeting is a mostly
scripted event full of self-congratulation, promises for the
future, gratitude to those present and assurances that the
management team is vigilant and forward-thinking. Only
rarely—if ever—does the meeting have a measurable impact
on the operations of the company or on the company's
constituents.
Occasionally, a meeting erupts into spectacle, with a handful of critics seeking to commandeer the proceedings, complaining about how much money the executives are making,
or hurling demands for the CEO's immediate resignation.
This is not an ideal way to ensure that best practices are
achieved.
Some reformers have advocated making more out of the
AGM, to include consideration of detailed budgets and a lineby-line review of the preceding year's performance." Others
advocate turning the AGM into a truly 'public occasion' with
debates featuring 'chosen representatives of the workers,
consumers and the community'." My suggestion is just the
opposite—that shareholders' meetings as we know them

years (from 1978 to 1992) to complete.
24 Regulation S-K, Items 401 and 404.
25 !bid, item 402.
26 !bid, Item 201.
27 (bid, item 303.
28 1 understand that there exists a Stock Exchange and Chartered Accountants Annual Award for Published Accounts. While this is a laudable
exercise, it does not include circulation to listed companies of the 'winning' reports. More importantly, the criteria for winning entries gives only
sparse guidance on the way in which corporate-governance Issues should
be treated ('good disclosure on corporate governance' is required).
29 Godfrey Rehaag, The Limited Company: Replacing the Victorian Steam
Engine (1994), 53-4. Rehaag would have the assembled body consider
whether the company had achieved its goals regarding 'improving quality,
reducing staff turnover, Increasing productivity ... even reducing the
corporation's environmental footprint'.
30 DG Goyder, The Just Enterprise (1987), 77-9.

should be abolished, except where some threshold number
of investors—say 12-20 percent of the total—is in agreement
that a meeting is necessary and appropriate." The threshold
could easily be met by institutional investors, and it would
not be impossible even for private investors to initiate the
process, especially when the issues involved are significant.
This proposal would save a lot of time on pageantry; it would
also make such meetings as occur truly useful ones, for which
investors and their advisors would carefully prepare and at
which serious performance-related issues (however 'performance' may be defined) could be examined in depth.
Merely the convening of a meeting would be a noteworthy
event and would signal a level of concern about a company
that would command the management's attention.
I recognise the idea of abandoning the in-person AGM may
reflect a cultural difference between our countries. 32 In the
United States, much of the hard work of corrective corporate
governance (which is usually what shareholders are concerned about) now often takes place in closed rooms, where
institutional investors—alone or in groups—meet with uncomfortable top executives and ask them very pointed, very
specific question S. 33
Often this work takes place very publicly, too—when
institutional investors publish lists of underperforming targets for their activities, when there are 'leaks' of discussions
aimed at identifying and correcting a company's biggest
problems, and (sometimes especially) when the business
press becomes involved and prints its own critiques of a
company's strategic choices, the management's claims of
progress or even individuals' management styles.
My point is that, in a highly developed economy, there are
far more effective ways to monitor and correct executive
behaviour—whether it be shirking, self-dealing, lack of vision
or incompetence—than to entrust these important issues to
the psychodrama of the AGM. For the Hampel Committee to
have given so much credibility to the AGM, therefore, was
surprising. For the Committee to state expressly that its
intention was to make the AGM 'a more meaningful and
interesting occasion for [the] participants' a3ndto4vi
stifling 'debate' 35 was especially disappointing.
It may be that concerns about the Insider Dealing Act—or
simply inertia—deters institutions in Britain from playing a
significant behind-the-scenes role in corporate oversight."
Or that companies are not yet comfortable in providing

31 In those years when actual meetings are not convened, routine matters
requiring shareholder votes would be handled exclusively by proxy
voting.
32 I understand, for example, that at a recent AGM of British Gas more than
5,000 shareholders showed up. That kind of turnout is unheard of in the
United States, though some shareholders' meetings do draw several
hundred participants. Often these meetings draw demonstrators and
picketers, too.
33 Recent studies show that the collective result of these activities, known as
the 'CalPERSeffect', has been significantly to enhance investment returns.
Constance EBagley and Richard H Koppes, 'Leader of the Pack A Proposal
for Disclosure of Board Leadership Structure' (1997) 34 San Diego Law
Review 149, note 9 and accompanying text.
34 Hampel Committee Report, para 5.13.
35 !bid, para 5.14.
36 John Piender makes the case that British institutions, with a handful of
exceptions, have (at worst) been disinterested and (at best) been ineffective in their behind-the-scenes dealings with British plcs: John Plender, A
Stake in the Future (1997), 134-7. Professor Stapiedon paints a somewhat
richer picture of some institutions' behind-the-scenes influence, especially in their dealings with non-executive directors: GP Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (1996), 77-8, 120-9 and
146-9.

access to investors to explore their concerns." If that is the
case, then investors—both large and small—may feel that
they have no other option than to use the AGM to make their
points. (Also, the AGM unquestionably provides an opportunity for Investors seeking publicity to command the press's
attention, and they may value this attention more than they
value real change.)
Either way, the next step in corporate governance, it seems
to me, will be to recognise the AGM for what it is—an artefact
of the days when companies at best had a handful of owners.
The AGM provides an illusion of participatory democracy that
really makes little sense in today's more complex world.
Looking to in-house compliance programmes as an
essential feature of effective corporate governance

The Hampel Committee Report in its section on internal
controls wisely notes that good corporate governance goes
beyond the boundaries of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations. Ensuring that adequate financial controls are in
place is only a first step in building a truly successful, accountable company. As the Hampel Report recognises, internal controls must also extend to 'controls to ensure effective
and efficient operations and compliance with laws and
regulations'.38 That being said, however, the Report then declines
to include the creation of internal monitoring programmes
(or even a modest internal audit function) in its menu of
recommended company best practices." That choice may
prove to be a costly mistake.
In the United States, In-house monitoring programmes
have been designed primarily to avert serious failures of
compliance with the law. They also, however, have profound
implications for the protection of investors and other corporate constituencies. For this reason, the Delaware Chancery
Court recently held that where there is a significant risk
(based on past experience, recent practices or otherwise)
that a company will violate the law (environmental regulations, for example) or engage in fraud (for example, in government contracting)—either of which can result in gargantuan
losses to the shareholders—a board of directors has an
obligation to ensure that the company employs information
and reporting systems that will detect and deter these problems, including a mechanism to get information about noncompliance directly into the hands of the board.40'[F]ailureto
do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least,
render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance
with applicable legal standards.'"
It may be that British companies haven't faced the kinds of
huge fines and damage awards that American companies
have faced in recent years" and that the risk of exposure of
37 In the United States, every public company has a shareholder-relations
function that is designed to respond to shareholder Inquiries, to facilitate
meetings with institutional Investors and generally to make sure that the
company's investors feel that their concerns are being attended to. A good
description of both the reactive and proactive practices of shareholderrelations professionals appears in Michael Useem, Executive Defence:
Shareholder Power and Corporate Reorganization (1993), 131-6.
38 Hampel Committee Report, para 6.13.
39 !bid, para 6.14.
40 Re Caremark International Inc Derivative Litigation 698 A 2d 959 (1996).
41 !bid at 970.
42 The Caremark case arose out of criminal proceedings In which the company was fined $250m for multiple acts of Medicare fraud, The shareholders sought to recover some or all of these losses from Caremark's directors,
alleging failure of oversight. In 1996, Archer Daniels Midland Co (ADM) was
fined $100m for US antitrust violations. Shareholders recently settled a
derivative suit against ADM's directors, employing a similar theory, for
$8m.

this sort seems remote. (It may also be that a reasonable
scepticism about the utility of internal monitoring programmes
prevails. It is true that vast resources might be spent in
perfecting a compliance programme that turns out not to
detect those practices that put a company in peril. It is also
true that compliance professionals—like other staff professionals—may seek to build their empires by stressing the
urgency of their task, while contributing little to the bottom
line.)
Nevertheless, a well-designed internal monitoring programme can be central not only to avoiding criminal and civil
liability, but also to averting insolvency. Internal audit programmes and other compliance programmes (including those
designed to monitor compliance with a company's or industry's ethical guidelines) provide an important mechanism for
ensuring that companies are spending their money wisely,
conducting their business legally and participating in the
marketplace in a manner designed to achieve responsible,
long-term success.
Thus, for the Hampel Committee to minimise the importance of internal monitoring programmes and to say that
'directors and management must always have the main responsibility for an effective system of controls'," without
noting that any such system will require human and financial
resources, leadership, influence and access to the board to
be truly effective, reflects more confidence in directors'
abilities than is prudent.
The irony of corporate governance is that corporate managers and their boards constantly have to navigate between
underperformance (due to timidity and mismanagement)
and overperformance (due to fraud and overreaching). The
Hampel Report suggests that sometimes directors are so
concerned about avoiding the latter that they fail to devote
sufficient energies to avoiding the former." The Committee
may be right, of course, but its failure to give adequate
emphasis to the need for internal monitoring—tailored to a
company's unique situation—seems extremely shortsighted
to me.
Three other issues referred to in the Hampel Committee
Report have generated some vocal criticism: (1) the question
of which outside directors ought to be considered 'independent' and who Is to decide in close cases; (2) the question
whether institutional investors should be required to participate in voting; and (3) the question whether shareholders
ought to be empowered to vote on individual compensation
packages.
The question of independence

On the first question, regarding independence, one response
would be to suggest that the answer is unimportant. A recent
study of US companies found that the presence of independent directors on a board 'has no consistent effect on marketadjusted stock price performance'." A more constructive
response would be to concede that no definition will cover
every situation and that traditional measures of independence (lack of a paid relationship to the company, for example,
or manner of selection) cannot capture those situations
where even those directors who appear to be independent
may not be because of social ties, a desire to be a team player
43 Hampel Committee Report, para 6.15.
44 Ibid. para 3.7.
45 Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, 'Do Independent Directors Matter?'
(Columbia University Working Paper). Two American companies most
often attacked for their boards' lack of independence, Walt Disney Co and
HJ Heinz Co, have each been top performers in recent years.

or simple passivity.
The Hampel Report is correct in suggesting that it is
probably not practicable to lay down a precise definition of
`independence'.46 A number of American groups have attempted to do so, as did the Cadbury Committee and, more
recently, PIRC. And while this exercise may be useful as a
guideline, trying to distinguish between directors who are or
are not 'independent'—in order to meet some arbitrary goal—
misses the point." What a company wants is a good director—one who does her homework, asks penetrating questions
and provides real leadership both in moving the company
forward and in keeping it out of trouble. The obsession—on
both sides of the Atlantic—with further categorisation is not,
frankly, all that productive." What is productive is ensuring
that outside directors are carefully selected, well-trained,
provided with staff when necessary, well-counseled by their
lawyers, evaluated periodically for effectiveness by their
colleagues, open to dialogue with institutional investors,
compensated in a manner designed to stimulate strong longterm performance and replaced when they become complacent. Hampel made most of these points.
Compulsory voting for institutions

On the question of whether institutional investors should be
required to vote, 1 am comfortable—based on the American
experience—in suggesting that the answer should be 'yes', at
least for those institutions that hold their shares as fiduciaries for others." I am further comfortable in suggesting that
institutions holding shares in a fiduciary capacity should
devise voting principles on recurring issues that can be
provided upon demand to the institution's beneficiaries. The
US teachers' pension fund, TIAA-CREF, provides one excellent example of a voting policy but there are also many
others that one could look to as a model. There are two
reasons for such policies—one is transparency; the other is
cost containment.
When American pension fund managers first came to
appreciate, in the mid-1980s, that they were expected to
46 Hampel Committee Report, para 3.9.
47 The US Business Roundtable shares this view. In Its Statement on Corpo
rate Governance, issued in August 1997, the Roundtable argued that
independence should be judged with respect to each director's circumstances, rather than through the 'mechanical application of rigid criteria'.
48 I concede that the situations in Britain and the US are quite different as
regards the impact of outside directors. The most recent study of Amer
icanbordsfeticahvergbodisnwmaup
of two Inside directors and nine outside directors:Korn/Ferry International
24th Annual Board of Directors Study (1997). In these circumstances, the
question of who is truly 'independent' may be less urgent than when the
proportion of non-executive directors is much lower.
49 Of course an institutional shareholder, like any shareholder, should be
permitted to abstain where, in the shareholder's considered judgment,
that is the proper course of action. Confidential voting is useful in minimising abstentions.
50 The policy provides, inter alto, that TIAA-CREF will vote in favour of
resolutions proposing confidential voting, against resolutions to create
multiple classes of stock with disparate voting rights, In favour of 'fair
price' provisions that preclude selective stock repurchases, against proposals that would impose any super-majority voting requirements and
against proposed actions that would serve to eliminate shareholders'
appraisal rights. See 'Excerpts from the TIAA-CREF Policy Statement on
Corporate Governance' (1994) Corporate Governance Advisor. May/June;
TIAA-CREF Guidelines for Voting Proxies on Executive Compensation'
(1994) Corporate Governance Advisor, September/October.

exercise their proxy-voting powers, the learning curve at first
was admittedly steep. Now, proxy voting has become quite
manageable—certainly there Is little difficulty in voting on
the routine matters that come up every year. Voting policies
minimise the cost of making decisions on most other issues
and cost-sharing (via the use of consultancies) is available for
responding to truly unique situations. Compulsory voting,
should it be enacted in Britain, is nothing to be feared.
Voting on remuneration

The final question—regarding shareholder ratification of
executives' compensation awards—is the least problematic
for me. In the US, companies must submit to their shareholders the names of individual nominees for each directorial
vacancy and certain proposals advanced by shareholders. If
an executive compensation plan requires shareholder approval (a determination based pri mar i ly on the regulations of
the Internal Revenue Service defining which plans are entitled to preferable tax treatment), detailed information must
be supplied (including information about the impact of the
plan on the five most highly paid executives and on others—
like NEDs—by category).51 It is not true, however, as some
critics believe, that American investors pass judgment on
each top executive's paycheque, or on the annual overall
compensation package for directors and officers as a group.
Only stock-based compensation plans may be subject to
shareholder approval, and not all such plans are.
In other words, in spite of the impenetrable, densely
worded resolutions that periodically appear on American
proxy solicitations seeking approval for specific incentive
compensation plans, there is no 'heckler's veto' for a company's yearly compensation figures, nor should there be. At
least four arguments support this position: (1) shareholder
disapproval of executive compensation awards could lead to
unwanted discontinuities and disruption of valuable leadership; (2) the costs of compensation would likely go up under
such a regime, rather than down; (3) the need to monitor
compensation issues in detail (that is, executive-by-executive) would increase the burden assumed by institutions,
with no compensating benefit; and (4) most shareholders
would vote without adequate information, and their own selfinterest (untempered by any fiduciary obligation to others)
may give rise to destructive opportunism.
Requiring shareholder approval of a company's annual
compensation package is, moreover, unnecessary. When a
company's performance and its directors' compensation are
significantly out of alignment, it is usually pretty obvious and
that is the time for action, whether it be a 'just-say-no' vote
against the directors, back-room negotiating by institutions
and others, criticisms by the business press, or some combination of all three. To involve shareholders In the routine
compensation decisions of every public company everyyearregardless of that company's or its executives' performance—would be inefficient, costly and unwise.
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